Emperors: Power, Tenure, and Policy Across Imperial China

The following figures are reproduced from Chen and Lin, "A Quantitative History of Regicide in China," Ch. 4 in Quantitative History of China (Springer, 2026), pp. 65–108. Open access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Subsample B = mainstream emperors from 221 BCE to 1911 CE (excludes fragmentation-era petty kings, who are in Subsample C). European data from Blaydes & Chaney (2013) and Eisner (2011).

Fig. 4.13. Ruler duration comparison among Chinese (Subsample B), European, and Islamic rulers. 100-year moving averages. China (blue) shows high volatility with no secular trend. Europe (gray) shows the only genuine secular increase. Islam (black) stays flat or declining. Source: Chen & Lin (2026, p. 98), data for Europe and Islam from Blaydes & Chaney (2013).

Fig. 4.10. Regicide rate comparison between China (Subsample B) and Europe. Regicide rate = number of regicides per 100,000 ruler-years. After 700 AD, the two series converge and decline in parallel toward near-zero by 1800. The decline in elite political violence is a shared Eurasian phenomenon, not uniquely Chinese. Source: Chen & Lin (2026, p. 94), European data from Eisner (2011).

The table below compares Huang's stated dynasty averages (from EAST, Ch. 5, pp. 162–63) with averages computed from Wang's individual ruler data (Harvard Dataverse). Differences arise from sample composition: Huang appears to count total dynasty years ÷ number of emperors, while Wang's data records individual tenures that may exclude interregna or co-regencies.

A. Does Chinese ruler tenure increase over time?

Huang's central empirical claim is that Chinese emperors ruled longer over time, attributing this to the Keju system's pacification of elites. His pre-Sui vs. post-Sui t-test (16 vs. 25 years, p=0.043) is the statistical backbone of this argument (Table 5.1, p. 168).

The test has n=13: one observation per dynasty, all within-dynasty variation suppressed. Wang Mang's 16-year usurpation carries the same weight as the 267-year Qing. The result is also fragile to composition. In the pre-Sui group, the Han-Sui Interregnum compresses 361 years and ~90 rulers into one low-average observation that pulls down the pre-Sui mean. In the post-Sui group, Kangxi's and Qianlong's 61-year reigns inflate the Qing dynasty average to 36 years, pulling the post-Sui mean up. Remove the Qing and significance likely vanishes. When Chen & Lin (2026, Fig. 4.13) apply a 100-year moving average to individual ruler data, the upward trend disappears entirely.

There is a further circularity problem: Huang's grouping variable (pre/post Sui) is chosen to correspond to his proposed mechanism (Keju). The cutpoint is the theory. With n=13, moving one observation across the boundary can flip significance.

B. Is China's ruler stability distinctive?

The cross-civilizational comparison shows China and Europe tracking closely on ruler tenure (15–18 years) throughout 1000–1800. The Islamic world is the real outlier, declining from ~16 to ~11 years. Chen & Lin's Figure 4.10 reinforces this: Chinese and European regicide rates converge after 700 AD and decline in parallel toward near-zero by 1800. If increasing ruler tenure caused stagnation, Europe should also have stagnated.

C. Where the data does show Chinese distinctiveness

Wang's deposal rate data reveals the genuine Chinese anomaly. Chinese rulers went from being deposed 55% of the time (c. 1000) to just 20% (c. 1800). European deposal rates declined only modestly (46% → 30%). The question is whether this reflects a deliberate ruler strategy (Wang's "sovereign's dilemma": rulers weakened the state to ensure personal safety) or a byproduct of institutional change (Keju pacified elites and fragmented gentry networks, making coups structurally harder). The fiscal data supports the second interpretation: China's tax/GDP ratio fell from ~17% under the Song to ~1% by the late Qing, but the fiscal decline tracks the localization of elite networks after the Tang-Song transition more than any deliberate policy choice.

Reference table of all mainline emperors from Qin unification through end of Qing, with principal minister/grand councilor where identifiable. Click ★ rows to expand analytical cards with sourced overviews of ideology and policy. Click dynasty headers to expand/collapse. Fragmentation-era rulers omitted; see Chen & Lin (2026) Subsamples B and C.